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In this article, we analyse changes in the contemporary management of private
Catholic schools under State contract in France since the 1980s. Writing from a
‘policy sociology’ perspective, we use data from previous studies on policy and
on public and private schools as well as from an ongoing research project
comparing policies of accountability in France and in Quebec. After presenting
an outline of the constitutional, legal and institutional context in which public
and religious schools operate, we show that the introduction of new public
management approaches and instruments in the ﬁeld of education has not exerted
a signiﬁcant inﬂuence either on the public management of State-controlled
private schools or on the coupling between the public and the private sector. The
management of Catholic schools is still mainly based, on the one hand, on
regulation through inputs and limited intervention by public authorities and, on
the other hand, on a complex system of internal moral controls by the private
authorities themselves. However, although the management of public and private
schools remains loosely coupled, some moves towards a closer interaction
between the authorities in charge of both systems have taken place in the last
decade.
Introduction
A growing body of research now stresses the increasing privatisation of school systems
in various parts of the world (Whitty and Power 2000; Ball 2007). Be it ‘endogenous’
(through the introduction of quasi-markets, new public management (NPM) or account-
ability policies) or ‘exogenous’ (through various forms of contracting, partnerships or
international capital building), these processes frequently redeﬁne the links between
private schools, including private faith schools, and political authorities (Ball and
Youdell 2007). In many OECD countries, these trends are indeed leading governments
to implement both new policies favouring private sector supply of education and
various instruments to control and monitor its activity (Mons 2011). A central issue
is therefore that of the tension between respecting and encouraging the autonomy of
the private (religious) sector and of private schools and increasing public scrutiny of
and intervention in their functioning (Glenn and Groof 2002).
The aim of this article is to bring new data and interpretations to this issue by focus-
ing on a speciﬁc national case study: France. France is an interesting case for the study
of this tension for three reasons. Historically, the strong implication of the State in the
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ﬁeld of education brought about the institutionalisation of a secular Republican school
created to a large extent in opposition to religious congregations (Lelièvre 1990). Ideo-
logically, many civil servants, teachers from the public sector and common citizens
show a strong attachment – at least in discourse – to public services and strongly
contest privatisation and neoliberalism, notably in education (Laval et al. 2011). At
the same time, parents and citizens have also demonstrated against attempts to
reunify public and private schools and brought about the resignation of a Minister of
education who made such a proposal under the ﬁrst Socialist government of François
Mitterrand (Prost 1993). There is also presently a growing political and scientiﬁc
concern about the contribution of private schools to a ‘ghettoisation at the top’ of the
French education system due to their increasing attractiveness and social selectivity
(Merle 2012). This concern is in turn leading some observers to criticise the limited
supervision of Catholic schools under State contracts.
We focus in this article on changes in the contemporary management of private
Catholic schools under State contract in France since the 1980s using data and new
information collected through interviews and a case study,1 and writing from a
‘policy sociology’ perspective (Ozga 1987; Ball 2006). These schools represent
about 95% of State-subsidised private schools and in 2011–2012 they hosted about
97.2% of the pupils registered in a private school (MEN-DEPP 2012). The importance
of this State-subsidised private sector and its speciﬁc form of institutionalisation, exam-
ined below, are two factors that contribute to make its comparison with the public sector
an interesting object of study. Our leading questions are the following: To what extent
is there a central State management of Catholic schools and what are its main charac-
teristics? Has this management been affected by the introduction of NPM principles and
techniques in the public sector and become more similar to the management of public
schools? To what extent is there a speciﬁc internal management of private Catholic
schools and how does it relate to public management? And ﬁnally, is there a movement
towards greater integration of the two systems or do both systems remain loosely
coupled?
Except for some recent accounts of the relationship between the State and private
education provided by high civil servants (Toulemonde 2009) or by researchers,
mainly through historical approaches (Poucet 2001, 2011; Verneuil 2011), these ques-
tions have attracted very little attention in France as evidenced by their virtual absence
from a recent review of research on private education (Poucet 2012). Studies on private
education deal with three topics that are not directly related to its management: parental
switching of children from public to private schools and vice versa, especially in big
cities and the motives and impact of their choices (Ballion 1980, 1991; Héran 1996;
Langouet and Léger 1997; van Zanten 2009; Merle 2010, 2011), the comparison of
pupils’ success and school careers in public and private schools (Ben Ayed 2000;
Tavan 2004) and, more exceptionally, the current transformations of non-Catholic
faith schools, for instance Jewish schools (Cohen 2011).
In the following pages, we ﬁrst present an outline of the legal and institutional
context in which private Catholic schools operate. This outline clearly highlights the
growing ‘public character’ of Catholic schools in France even if this trend is not hege-
monic.2 In a second section we show that the introduction of NPM approaches and
instruments – including a focus on outcomes rather than inputs and the introduction
of projects, contracts and evaluations – in the ﬁeld of education has not until now
exerted a signiﬁcant inﬂuence either on the public management of State-controlled
private schools or on the coupling between the public and the private sector. This
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management, based on regulation through inputs and little direct intervention, has
allowed to a large extent private authorities to develop their own modes of formal
and informal regulation and contributed to the persistence of a loosely coupled
system of management of private and public schools despite some minor recent
changes towards a closer interaction.
The growing public character of French Catholic schools
The ﬁrst ofﬁcial texts – the Education Act of 1806 and the Education Decree of 1808 –
that founded the French contemporary school system did not mention Catholic schools
speciﬁcally (Poucet 2011). The subsequent imposition by the political leaders of the
Third Republic of a system of public education through the secularisation of teaching
and curriculum (Education Act of 1882), the secularisation of education staff (edu-
cation Act of 1886) and the ofﬁcial separation of the Church and the State (Act of
1905) were to a large extent decisions taken against religious congregations and
were accompanied by major social conﬂicts. These conﬂicts have sometimes been
revived by mass demonstrations against various reform projects concerning private
education, for instance those of 1984 and 1994,3 at least in the national imaginary.
Nevertheless, the Debré Act of 1959 established a durable political balance between
both sides (Toulemonde 2009, 253). The maintenance, but also the evolution, of this
balance have progressively driven Catholic schools to become more ‘public’ at two
levels. On the one hand, the Act underlined their contribution to the public service
and, on the other, it constrained their autonomy by increasing the degree of formal
State regulation.
The durability of a soft compromise: the Debré Act (1959)
The Constitution of 1958 deﬁning the current French 5th Republic asserts two founding
principles in education. The ﬁrst one is secularism (laïcité), also mentioned in the article
L. 141-1 of the French code of education: ‘the Nation guarantees equal access of chil-
dren and adults to instruction, training and culture: the organisation of a free and secular
education at every level is a State duty’. This principle implies the secular nature of
teaching, curriculum, staff and school premises and the optional character of religious
teaching in private schools. But it also requires that the State is neutral towards religion
and that public education must not be developed at the expense of religious instruction,
hence for instance the obligation for the State to keep one day free during the week for
parents who would like to provide their children with religious instruction.
The second principle is educational freedom leading to the protection of alternative
forms of education such as private education, but also home schooling. Article L. 151-3
of the French code of education therefore states that primary and secondary schools can
be public or private, the former being ﬁnanced by the State and local political auth-
orities whereas particular actors or associations support the latter.
The Debré Act of 1959 –which is still the legal reference despite several attempts to
reform it – tried to reconcile these two partially contradictory principles in three ways.
First, it (re)asserts the founding principles while slightly reformulating them: the State
must provide an education to all children according to their aptitudes ‘with equal
respect for all beliefs’. It must respect freedom of religious practice and religious
instruction (liberté des cultes et de l’instruction religieuse) among pupils attending
public schools (art. L. 141-2) and it must preserve the educational freedom of private
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schools abiding ofﬁcial norms (art. L.151-1). Second, the Act introduces the possibility
for private schools to sign a contract with the State. There are two kinds of contracts: the
‘simple contract’ and the ‘association contract’. Their characteristics are synthesised in
Table 1.
These contracts imply that private schools have to comply with speciﬁc State
requirements (for instance the obligation to accommodate all kind of pupils, not only
those who have the same religion, or the possibility for each teacher to be inspected
by State inspection bodies) but also that their ‘speciﬁc character’ (caractère propre)
must be preserved. Private schools that sign a contract can therefore organise and
manage various activities according to their religious orientations, but only if these
activities do not affect the transmission of the national and secular curriculum.
Finally, the legal framework of the Debré Act also stipulates that the State does not
recognise private education as such but only a variety of private schools whose activity
is framed by speciﬁc contracts and ofﬁcial texts.
Retrospectively, the Debré Act seems to have been quite successful in favouring the
maintenance and development of the private sector. About 13% of pupils in primary
education in France and 21% in secondary education have been registered each year
in a private school since the beginning of the 1990s. The proportion of pupils using
the private sector is even much higher if pupils’ movements from one sector to
another are taken into account as two pupils out of ﬁve (belonging to almost 50% of
families) spend at least one year in a private school (Langouet and Léger 1997).
Given that about 95% of private schools under State contract are Catholic (Toulemonde
2009, 254) and that there has been in France a long process of secularization of social
life, some observers have argued that this Act has prevented the otherwise fatal decline
of French Catholic schools (Poucet 2011). For instance, despite secularization, the
number of secondary private schools has remained stable (around 3500) since 2000
Table 1. Two kinds of contracts for private schools.
Simple contract Association contract
Conditions
required
The school has been in operation for at least ﬁve years
Teachers have the required qualiﬁcations
The number of pupils is sufﬁcient (there exists a ‘recognised education need’)
Buildings are appropriate
Scope Primary education only Primary and secondary education
Status of
teachers
The school recruits teachers with the
same level of qualiﬁcation as their
public counterparts on the basis of a
private contract, but paid by the
State
Teachers, with the same level of
qualiﬁcation as their public
counterparts, are either civil
servants (‘maîtres titulaires de la
fonction publique’) or State contract
teachers
Curriculum The school must comply with 80% of
the national curriculum
Total respect of the national
curriculum and associated
requirements (hours of teaching,
examinations, inspections, etc.)
Funders Parents and schools raise and manage
budgets. Municipalities are not
obliged to provide ﬁnancial support
to schools
Same organisation as in the public
sector
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(MEN-DEPP 2012). However, at the same time, the Debré Act and the modiﬁcations
that were introduced later to it, as well as other factors addressed in the following sec-
tions, have progressively increased the ‘public character’ of Catholic schools.
Catholic schools increasingly ‘public-dependent’
The growing public character of private schools takes various forms. It is ﬁrst visible in
the number of pupils’ attending private schools under contract with the State. Since the
1980s, the average proportion of primary and secondary education pupils registered in
private schools under State contract has been above 90% (97.2% in 2011–2012). The
association contract is far more widespread although it imposes more constraints on
private schools.4 It is dominant in secondary education but also, to a lesser extent, in
primary education. According to the French association of education administrators
(AFAE), only one-third of private education pupils are registered in schools with a
simple contract.
Another key factor is the substantial and fast decline of religious staff among tea-
chers in Catholic schools since 1950. As noted by Jacqueline Lalouette (in Poucet
2011), in 1952, nearly all of the 50,000 teachers in Catholic schools were priests or
nuns. In 1973–1974, 87.1% of the 100,000 teachers were lay teachers.5 This author
also points out that this change has led Catholic authorities to regularly question the
motives of teachers who choose to teach in Catholic schools. These motives tend to
become more diverse and less related to religion and ideology (for instance, avoiding
an ofﬁcial appointment in a disadvantaged public school, being sure to be recruited
locally, working in a more ‘humane’ organization, etc.). She also reports Catholic auth-
orities’ difﬁculties to ﬁnd teachers who meet their expectations concerning Catholic
education. Furthermore, the Lang-Couplet agreements enacted in 1992 for primary edu-
cation and in 1993 for secondary education have, among other things, transferred to the
State the obligation to train private schools teachers and modiﬁed their recruitment by
State-subsidised private schools. Headteachers in private schools, who still have the
ﬁnal say concerning the appointment of teachers, must now choose among a list of can-
didates who succeeded at a competitive national examination (concours), very similar
to the one taken by students preparing to teach in the public sector (Verneuil in Poucet
2011).6
Also, State-subsidised private schools must comply with a series of requirements
guaranteeing the transmission of a secular curriculum. According to the high central
inspector Toulemonde (2009), even schools under simple contract rarely take the
liberty that they were given to comply with only 80% of the national curriculum to
develop their own curriculum since it would be a risk to disadvantage pupils in their
school career. Catholic and other faith schools have indeed the possibility to provide
curricular and extracurricular activities allowing for the expression of their ‘speciﬁc
character’ (caractère propre) but these activities must be implemented in addition to
the transmission of this national curriculum. In addition to this, this ‘catch-all’
notion, which was not precisely deﬁned in the Debré Act, is supposed to integrate
different dimensions, not only the religious and spiritual ones, and in fact forced Catho-
lic authorities to more clearly deﬁne their educational project. If some Catholic texts
underlined the ‘Gospel spirit’7 and the ‘Christian conception of reality’ that must
prevail in schools in the 1960s and the 1970s (Lalouette in Poucet 2011, 88–89), the
status of the French Catholic education adopted in 19928 emphasises the fact that
Catholic education pursues two main goals (teaching for the Nation and society and
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teaching Catholic faith) and that its educational project integrates ‘all noble causes’ and
takes into account the diversity of cultures beyond the fundamental reference to the
Gospel. The last status adopted in April 2013 conﬁrms Catholic education’s mission
of serving the ‘general interest’ by reasserting the need to meet this goal through a
speciﬁc and original curricular provision.9 All of these elements contribute to a
growing formal separation between teaching and religious activities.
It is also important to note that the possibility to refer to their ‘speciﬁc character’
was perceived by Catholic schools, at least since the 1970s, as an opportunity to
provide and market alternative educational models. This was done through the blending
in their educational projects of their original Catholic mission with other dimensions
and the creation of new market niches responding to different parental demands con-
cerning school results, pedagogy and discipline (Ballion 1981; Prost 1981; van
Zanten 2009; Costa and van Zanten in Poucet 2011).
A fourth important factor is related to funding, which is increasingly public even if
registration fees for parents may be high. Under the association contract, funding is
almost the same as in the public sector: the State-subsidises teachers, curriculum, organ-
ization of diplomas, etc. and local political authorities have in charge the school pre-
mises, classroom equipment and school meals. The funding by local authorities often
allows private schools to pay the salaries of non-teaching members of staff. Under
the simple contract, in principle municipalities are not obliged to fund private
primary school but this is decreasingly the case. In primary education, municipalities
must even pay for pupils who want to study in a private school outside the city
(Toulemonde 2009).
Finally, as shown by various studies, the motives of parents who choose private
Catholic schools are decreasingly religious10 (except for Catholic families who
attend Church regularly) and increasingly diversiﬁed. The search for a better quality
as measured by school results plays a central role (globally, private schools tend to out-
perform public schools although this is to a large extent due to their selectiveness)
(Ballion 1981; Langouet and Léger 1997). Parents, however, also tend to think that
private education proposes more diversiﬁed educational provision and more opportu-
nities for an education ‘patterned’ to the needs and tastes of each child, allowing
pupils to develop and express their personality and forming all-round subjects (van
Zanten 2009).
Does the state only ‘pay and withdraw’?
Has this increasing public character led the State to renew its management of Catholic
schools? And if this is the case, what are the main features of this new State manage-
ment? Does it contribute to bridge the gap between private and public education? To
answer these questions, we use data from an on-going NewAGE research study,
which compare policies of accountability in France and in Québec. In this project,
we analyse the implementation of NPM procedures and of new policies of accountabil-
ity in education in France that has taken place under the generic slogan of ‘outcomes-
based management’ (pilotage par les résultats) since the 1980s and its possible impact
on State-subsidised private schools. Here, we use these data with two purposes: under-
standing the traditional management of Catholic education in France and appreciating
the possible changes introduced by this ‘outcomes-based management’, both on private
education and on its connection with public education.
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The permanence of a traditional and loosely coupled management
Our initial work in this project highlighted two main features of the national manage-
ment of Catholic schools.
The ﬁrst is the importance still given by the Ministry and the representatives of
Catholic education to a particular type of management which combines a strong focus
on regulation through inputs (and irregular ex post control through the inspection of tea-
chers), a highly politicised management of ‘hot issues’ directly by theMinister’s cabinet
and very limited attempts to exert regular administrative control and scrutiny of private
schools. The persistence of this type of management was visible in two speciﬁc data sets
that we selected and analysed to explore the introduction of NPM11 as well as in the
interviews we have conducted with high civil servants from the central administration
of theMinistry (especially within the department in charge of ﬁnancial issues, theDirec-
tion des affaires ﬁnancières (DAF)). Threemain features must be underlined. First, most
managerial meetings between the ministry and private education representatives consist
in deciding each year the amount of public funds devoted to private education and dis-
tributed to the various education regional territories and to teachers’ managerial staff.
Very few mechanisms of control intervene beyond the veriﬁcation that teachers are
indeed recruited and their possible inspection in classrooms. Second, the amount of
this public funding is generally decided according to a tacit budgetary rule (the ‘80%/
20%’ rule12), which is reproduced each year and is part of a strong implicit consensus
among participants. This rule allows theministry to limit the development of private edu-
cation but provides at the same time a stable and predictable framework within which
Catholic authorities can handle the complex internal organisation of Catholic education.
Third, the ofﬁces within theMinistry of education devoted to private education are small
units and their main function is to translate and apply decisions taken in public education
onto private education, especially as this concerns staff management. If they may be
associated to some NPM processes, such as the contract process between the central
administration and the academies mentioned below, the main budgetary decisions are
taken in parallel to these processes according to the aforementioned rules. This has con-
tinued to be the case after 2006 and the implementation of a new law, the LOLF, which
makes it mandatory for all public services to measure their performance.13
The analysis of the ofﬁcial circulars that are published at the beginning of each
school year (circulaires de rentrée) and which are key ofﬁcial texts providing directives
for the organization of the educational system in the French institutional context, also
shows that there is still an important disjunction between the State management of
public and private education. These circulars very seldom mention private education.
A statistical textual study of one data set gathering circulars for the period 1998–
2012 showed that State contract private schools were quoted only seven times, either
to indicate that a particular action also concerned private education or to invite
private schools to comply with national regulation through various stylistic processes
(for instance the use of the future tense in expressions such as ‘private schools will
conform to’, etc.). In both cases, quotations do not refer to new managerial initiatives
but to more general educational issues such as the implementation of new options or the
provision of educative support and tutoring.
A low impact of state new managerial initiatives
The progressive implementation by the State of a new ‘outcomes-based management’
does not seem to have modiﬁed this regulation regime. For instance, private education
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is seldom mentioned in traditional professional and institutional journals14 that present
and discuss changes in the public management of education although high civil servants
and advisers of ministers in various cabinets have frequently publicly declared that
some initiatives in private education (for instance, the development of projects and con-
tracts or the notion of ‘educational community’; put forward in the Education Act of
1989), motivated political leaders and policy-makers to ask for the introduction of
changes in the public sector.15
Furthermore, our on-going study on a speciﬁc and emblematic new managerial
tool – contracts established since 1998 between the central administration of the
ministry and its regional authorities (rectorats) – reveals that considerations about
private education are integrated in the process at a very general level but that the
speciﬁc features of the private sector are not taken into account in actual practice.
For instance, as far as the three regional educational territories studied in the
NewAGE project are concerned (the academies of Créteil, Lyon and Versailles), the
recent documents at the basis of the yearly managerial dialogue process (dialogue de
gestion) between the central and regional administrations as well as the four-year con-
tracts signed between the two parties only evoke private education as general contextual
data (through indicators on the number of private schools) or through statistical indi-
cators aggregating both private and public education (like the percentage of pupils
passing national exams). Private education is neither referred to speciﬁcally – with
respect for instance to targeted indicators, speciﬁc measures or particular objectives –
nor compared to public education, even in regional territories with a high proportion
of private schools such as the académie of Lyon.
This absence of references to private schools is also noticeable in the texts and public
discourses devoted to NPM and ‘outcomes-based management’ that have proliferated
since the end of the 1970s.While it is logical to suppose that these new forms of manage-
ment have therefore not had any signiﬁcant impact on the national management of
private schools and have not contributed to a closer integration of private and public edu-
cation, it is important to point out the gap between public management discourse and
action in public education itself. As shown by several research studies on the transform-
ations of regulation and governance of the French (public) education system, the intro-
duction of NPMhas beenmore rhetorical than real (Maroy 2006). It has given birth to an
inﬂation of incantatory discourses, to many articles and public interventions by pro-
fessionals and high civil servants, but also to an ambiguous institutionalisation of
new managerial tools which are in fact rarely linked to high institutional stakes (Pons
2010). In fact, the traditional mode of regulation of the French education system is
still strongly based on three main pillars: a neo-corporatist mode of decision-making
based on the interaction between State ofﬁcials and teacher union representatives, a
strong, centralised, bureaucratic administration and the importance given to the char-
isma and ethos of both decision-makers and teachers (van Zanten 2008).
The limited diffusion of NPM in public education does not seem to favour its trans-
fer to private education. A further reason that might explain why public authorities have
not been very keen on extending it to the private sector has to do with the fact that a
focus on outcomes tends to enhance the already better reputation of private schools
with respect to public schools. This is so because some of the speciﬁc features of
private schools make them appear more effective than they actually are. Because
private schools can select their pupils, and because parents who choose the private
sector and pay for private schools have higher expectations for their children, it is
easier for private schools to perform better than public schools on league tables and
64 X. Pons et al.
other types of accountability instruments. However, although a regulation based on out-
comes might increase competition between public and private schools, it is important to
point out that it is difﬁcult to assess the exact impact of each sector as many pupils now
move from the public to the private sector and vice versa, and their results reﬂect these
mixed trajectories.
A more sophisticated analysis of the limited impact of NPM on private schools must
nevertheless also take into account the internal regulation of private education, which is
quite impervious to the top-down and bureaucratic mode of regulation and introduction
of reforms in the public sector. Historically, ‘Catholic education’ is an umbrella term to
designate a wide variety of schools with a strong tradition of independence and whose
head teachers enjoy considerable autonomy. According to the institutional status of the
school, the latter are appointed either by a representative of a speciﬁc religious congre-
gation or by the head of the diocese, both acting under the authority of the bishop.
Schools, and private education in general, have a strong tradition of self-government.
State representatives and high civil servants are not encouraged to supervise them,
especially not during periods of actual or potential conﬂict. Indeed, several times in
history the State has decided in favour of private schools’ autonomy rather than the
regulatory initiatives of local civil servants (Poucet 2011).
Due to this strong tradition, even very limited attempts by State ofﬁcials to intro-
duce management tools at the national and local levels tend therefore to be seen by
private authorities and schools as a form of illegitimate State overstepping over the
autonomy of the private sector. In addition to that, it is important to note that State
efforts to diffuse new modes of management into the Catholic sector also have to
contend with an increasingly complex distribution of responsibilities within Catholic
education and with the emergence of new instances. This complexity is due to the
fact that the decentralisation of the French education system since 1980s, which has
had a strong impact on Catholic schools under State association contract, and the
growing imperative to manage staff has led Catholic educational authorities to create
organisations at various levels, with speciﬁc mandates16 including the development
of speciﬁc management devices.17
Moreover, it is important to underscore that while the strength of bureaucracy in the
public sector both facilitates the introduction of top-down reforms and limits their
impact by absorbing them into a common mould (van Zanten 2012), the dominant
mode of regulation in the private sector, which is very different, leads their representa-
tives both to be wary of and to have a more negative view of the impact of bureaucratic
and NPM tools developed by national State ofﬁcials. The power relations within the
private sector are not, as in the public sector, strongly conditioned by legal principles
and instruments. Indeed the legal foundation of the internal organisation of Catholic
education is still weak, since it has no status in French administrative law (Toulemonde
in Poucet 2011, 128). The authority of the General Secretary of Catholic education at
the national level and that of Diocese’s Directors at the level of each department is
essentially moral. In addition to that the micropolitics of the private sector do not
have, as in the public sector, a clear hierarchical basis: the private national authorities
have no direct power on decisions taken by the Dioceses and the latter cannot directly
control the activities of schools. The cohesion and effectiveness of the system are
strongly dependent on the moral commitment of different actors, which is obtained
through selection and socialization processes but also through the exertion of moral
pressures to reduce resistance or deviance and create consensus at every institutional
level. The Catholic authorities, who have always tried to protect this implicit and
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value-laden mode of coordination from what they perceived as the negative impact of
State bureaucracy, also believe that NPM tools will also contribute to its erosion. On
their side, public authorities feel that this mode of regulation does not provide a
solid foundation for a government-based accountability and a State-driven form of
NPM.
The fact that Catholic education authorities and public authorities are confronted
with similar problems concerning the governance and reform of large educational
systems seems nevertheless to be giving way to similar efforts to develop more soph-
isticated management tools. These tools however still differ in their conception and
even more in their use due to their embeddedness in different regulation frameworks.
The interviews we have conducted at the General Secretary of Catholic Education
and at several Dioceses also show a growing level of dialogue with public ofﬁcials con-
cerning national policy decisions on key areas such as teacher training or the school
curriculum. This dialogue does not however favour homogeneity but rather the
strengthening of a speciﬁc type of loose coupling, whereas greater openness to
school reform is associated with a strong determination to preserve and when possible
enhance the speciﬁc features of Catholic private schools.
Conclusion
Interpreting institutional reproduction
In this article, we have shown that despite the growing public character of private
schools and the progressive implementation in public education of a speciﬁc govern-
ment-based accountability and State-driven form of NPM, the national management
of French Catholic schools has evolved very little since the beginning of the 1980s.
Regulation of this sector is still based on inputs (ﬁnancial and human resources, regu-
latory texts on the provision of education) and on a weak, targeted and politicised ex
post control. To quote Poucet (2011, 38) who was describing the situation in the
1970s, to a large extent, ‘the State [still] pays and withdraws’. Based on a series of
tacit and low constraining rules, this management system leads to a loosely coupled
model of organisation of public and private schools and to a voluntary reciprocal ignor-
ance of the complexity of each system.
Why is this management still in place despite the fact that it limits the State’s
capacity to regulate educational processes and results? Although our ongoing research
study might help us provide a more complex explanation, it is clear that the existing
arrangements and compromises are viewed by State and Catholic national representa-
tives and policy-makers alike as a ‘satisﬁcing’ global strategy (Simon 1952). Since an
optimal consensual agreement is difﬁcult to conceive and even more difﬁcult to put into
practice, this strategy is seen as at least protecting against excesses such as the liberal-
isation of the education system and ﬁerce competition between private and public
schools as well as against burning political struggles that might favour radical and
unilateral stances and get out of their control, that both types of authorities morally
condemn and that would erode their actual power.
In addition to that, the degree of institutionalisation of existing arrangements and
compromises is such that it seems that only a very powerful exogenous shock, one
capable of redeﬁning system needs, will be able to alter it signiﬁcantly (Mahoney
2000). However, since the Debré Act of 1959, although successfully embedding
private education into the ideological and regulatory foundations of the French
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school, has left open the question of its concrete modes of organisation and manage-
ment, changes in the social and policy context have brought and will continue to
give birth to evolutionary and incremental changes (Campbell 2004; Streek and
Thelen 2005) that might progressively alter the general institutional framework
(Lindbom 1959).
Notes
1. We use data from previous studies on choice of private schools and on the internal dynamics
of private schools (van Zanten 2009; van Zanten and Costa in Poucet 2011) as well as from
an ongoing research project comparing policies of accountability in the public and private
sectors in France and in Quebec. This last project is based on interviews, in the public and
private sectors, with national policy-makers, high civil servants, administrative staff in
schools and parents, as well as on the analysis of several data sets of public documents (ofﬁ-
cial texts, press dispatches, professional and institutional reviews) and on a case study of the
implementation of a new contract programme between the central administration of the min-
istry of education and regional and local educational authorities.
2. ‘Public’ and ‘public character’ refer here to the notion of ‘public service’ and its conception
in France, where it traditionally designates both a set of activities and organisations under
political authorities’ responsibility, a legal status with its own obligations and privileges
and a strong source of legitimacy since public service is supposed to materialise and guar-
antee the ‘general interest’ (Chevallier 2003). Education in France is mainly provided by the
State, local political authorities and some associations with a public service mission. The
distinction public/private used here is similar to that of Bader and Maussen (2012, 92)
who distinguish governmental and non-governmental schools, even if our presentation
also stresses the empirical limits of such distinctions.
3. On June 24, 1984, opponents to the socialist project of creation of a uniﬁed secular public
service of education, including private education, organized a mass demonstration to pre-
serve pluralism and educational freedom. On January 16, 1994, on the contrary, it was
the turn of those opposed to the deregulation of the development of private education to
demonstrate in the streets against a bill project to eliminate the article 69 of the Falloux
Act (1850) which limited the ﬁnancial support of secondary private schools by the State
and local political authorities (cities, départements, regions). In both cases, these demon-
strations, widely covered by the media, were the ﬁnal outcomes of political dynamics
where radical stances prevailed on moderate ones and led the government to abandon its
initial project (Robert 2010).
4. The latter have less autonomy in the coverage of the national curriculum and they cannot
recruit (and dismiss) teachers as easily as when they are hired on a private contract as in
a private school under simple State contract.
5. The trend is the same for other categories, even if the proportions are lower. For instance, in
1974, already 51% of headteachers of private schools were lay headteachers. From 1994, the
leader of the General Secretary of catholic education (SGEC) is a lay person (Toulemonde
2009).
6. Two separate concours have been maintained, but the subjects, the exercises and the com-
position of the jury are very similar.
7. Vatican II, Gravissimum educationis momentum, 28th October 1965.
8. Conférence des évêques de France, Statut de l’enseignement catholique, 14 mai 1992.
9. Conférence des évêques de France, Statut de l’enseignement catholique, 18 avril 2013.
10. Antoine Prost (1981) was one of the ﬁrst scholars to point out that a symmetric process could
be observed concerning public education with a decreasing loyalty of some families toward
public services.
11. The ﬁrst data set comprises 958 dispatches published since 1998 by AEF, a press agency
that specialises in education issues. AEF was created in 1998. It offers its clients a continu-
ous, synthetic and factual stream of information concerning the implementation of reforms
in the educational system and the evolution of national public debate in the area of compul-
sory and higher education. (See www.aef.info). The second one comprises the 300 ofﬁcial
texts (circulars, decrees, arrêtés etc.) published on private education since 1987 and listed
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by the French Ministry of education on a speciﬁc on-line database called Mentor (See http://
www.education.gouv.fr/pid285/le-bulletin-ofﬁciel.html).
12. This rule is not mentioned in any ofﬁcial text but according to our interviewees, it has been
tacitly and loyally reproduced for decades. It consists in giving to private education 20% of
the budget devoted to public education. Thus the formula ‘80%/20%’ is misleading. Private
education is not given 20% of the global budget of the State devoted to education, but 20%
of the budget devoted to public education, that is to say between 17% and 18% of the global
State budget.
13. The LOLF (Loi organique relative aux Lois de ﬁnances) was voted in 2001 by Parliament
and enforced in 2006. It reorganises the budget of the State, its structure and its process in
‘missions’ with a focus on policies rather than ministries. Each mission includes several
programmes in which various actions are targeted, with detailed objectives and various
indicators. According to this law, the budget given to the missions by the Parliament
directly depends on the capacity of the State to meet its goals as they are mentioned
and measured in the programmes. The Parliament has in theory the right, within the
same mission, to move budgets from a programme to another according to results. The
head of each programme (which is not the minister) can do the same within the same
programme between different kinds of actions. In primary and secondary education, the
mission enseignement scolaire includes six programmes. Programme 139 is devoted to
private education. If other programmes like those for primary public education (pro-
gramme 140) or secondary public education (programme 141) are led by the head of an
important central administrative department (the DGESCO), programme 139 is under
the responsibility of the head of the department devoted to ﬁnancial issues (DAF). If
this choice is consistent with the structure of the programme (99% of the programme cor-
responds to staff salaries), it is also a sign of the weak integration of private education in
State management strategies. Contrary to other programmes, which gave birth to a trans-
lation at the regional level of academies and therefore to a strategic discussion between the
central administration and regional education representatives (recteurs in particular), pro-
gramme 139 was still managed nationally by the head of the DAF until the year 2012.
From that date, and in compliance with the lessons of an experimentation launched in
2006, the management of the programme was transferred at the regional education level
of the rectorats.
14. We analysed all the contributions on the ‘outcomes based management’ published in the fol-
lowing journals: L’éducation (1968–1980), Courrier de l’éducation (1975–1981), L’éduca-
tion Hebdo (1980–1982), Cahiers de l’Éducation nationale (1982–1986), Les amis de
Sèvres (1949–1988), Éducation et pédagogies (1989–1993), Revue internationale d’éduca-
tion (1994–2012), Administration et éducation (1979–2012), Éducation et management
(1989–2009), Nouveaux regards (1994–2012).
15. See for instance Toulemonde (in Poucet 2011, 123).
16. For instance, the CAEC (Comités académiques de l’enseignement catholique), i.e. commit-
tees which gather the representatives of various unions and authorities, were created in 1985
and are supposed to be the interlocutors of the State for the regional management of tea-
chers. In 1992, in a context of a decreasing inﬂuence of religious congregations on the
appointment of head teachers, the episcopacy created a speciﬁc body for these appoint-
ments, the diocese council of supervision (‘conseil diocésain de tutelle’) (Toulemonde
2009).
17. Like the observatory Solfege which aim is to organise teachers’ management (Toulemonde
2009).
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